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Rights at the Ballot Box: The Effect of Judicial




The Bill of Rights in the United States Constitution grants
many rights to criminal defendants. State courts have the same
duty as the federal courts to protect the federal constitutional
rights of criminal defendants.1 Because most of criminal law is the
responsibility of the states and because the federal courts do not
have the capacity to oversee all state criminal trials, the state
courts' ability to protect these rights becomes more compelling.
2
This duty to protect can be difficult to perform when state
judges may be voted out of office. The difficulty arises because the
public reacts strongly toward criminal defendants. The public is
typically hostile toward them. As Judge Aldisert said in United
States v. Janotti:
The rights conferred upon our society by judges of the Third
Article [of the United States Constitution] emanated from
cases in which the defendants were unpopular and generally
regarded as transgressors - Dollree Mapp, Danny Escobedo,
and Ernesto Miranda quickly come to mind. In each case, a
court, not a jury, drew the line of demarcation between per-
nissible and impermissible police conduct to insure that en-
forcers of society's laws would not violate established moral
frontiers while exercising their stewardship; it was federal
judges, unmindful of editorials and broadcast plaudits, who
chose to stand tall and unbending.... [F]ederal judges were
unwilling to relegate the formulation of these protections to
the "coquetry of public opinion .... ",3
* J.D. 1989, University of Minnesota.
1. "[It was said to be a recognized portion of the duty of this court - and, we
will add, of all other courts, National and State - 'to give preference to such princi-
ples and methods of procedure as shall serve to conciliate the distinct and in-
dependent tribunals of the States and of the Union, so that they may cooperate as
harmonious members of a judicial system coextensive with the United States, and
submitting to the paramount authority of the same Constitution, laws, and Federal
obligations.' " Ex parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241, 252 (1886).
2. See Wayne LaFave & Jerold Israel, Criminal Procedure § 1.2(a) (1984).
3. 673 F.2d 578, 616 (3d Cir. 1982) (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
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Elected state judges are not as insulated from the "coquetry of
public opinion" as are federal judges, who have life tenure. If the
public perceives a state judge as "soft on crime" or as one who
"coddles criminals," or if the judge makes a favorable ruling for an
unpopular defendant in a highly publicized case, the public can
have retribution against the judge at the polls. 4 Federal judges do
not have these problems because they are not elected nor may
their salaries be reduced.
5
Since federal courts have only a limited capacity to hear mat-
ters of state criminal law,6 state courts' ability to protect federal
constitutional rights cannot be impaired. Yet as Justice Brennan
said, "It cannot be denied that state court judges are often more
immediately 'subject to majoritarian pressures than federal courts,
and are correspondingly less independent than their federal coun-
terparts.' "7 The American Bar Association Commission of Profes-
sionalism agreed. It stated that "judges are far less likely to...
take... tough action if they must run for reelection or retention
every few years."s Thus, state judges must have the independence
of federal judges if federal constitutional rights are to be fully
enjoyed.
The purpose of this article is to show that elections can ham-
per a judge's ability to be an impartial, unbiased adjudicator. Since
an impartial judge is a fundamental requirement of due process,
these elections should be eliminated. Section II surveys criminal
defendants' rights, shows the public hostility toward the exercise
of those rights, and demonstrates the role that state courts must
play to protect those rights as well as show public hostility toward
those rights. Section III provides examples of judges who have
faced public pressure because of their role in criminal trials or ap-
peals. Section IV examines the current methods of judicial selec-
tion and retention and shows what oversight the federal courts
have played. Section V discusses the policies behind judicial elec-
tions and shows how the electoral process is not suited for the ju-
"As Justice Frankfurter noted, it is precisely because appeals based on criminal
process guarantees are so often made by 'dubious characters' that infringement of
those guarantees calls for 'alert and strenuous resistance'; . ..criminal process
guarantees are 'normally invoked by those accused of crime, and criminals have
few friends.'" LaFave & Israel, supra note 2. See also Justice Under Reagan, U.S.
News & World Rep., Oct. 14, 1985, at 58 (poll shows 87% of Americans believe
courts should be more harsh on crime).
4. See infra p. 125-30.
5. U.S. Const. art III, § 1.
6. See supra note 2.
7. William Brennan, The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L.Rev. 535, 551 (1986).
8. Report of Commission on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986).
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diciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct will be emphasized. Section
VI surveys the various government actors who can eliminate elec-
tions and the possible solutions.
II. Defendants' Rights and the Role of Trial and Appellate Judges in
Safeguarding Those Rights
A. The Rights and the Judge's Role
The fourth through the eighth amendments of the Bill of
Rights grant many protections to citizens accused of crime. These
protections include the fifth amendment right to exclude involun-
tary or illegally obtained confessions,9 the fourth amendment right
to exclude illegally obtained evidence, 10 the sixth amendment
rights to have the prosecutor provide to the defense any exculpa-
tory evidencell and to confront adverse witnesses,12 and the eighth
amendment right not to be inflicted with cruel or unusual
punishment.13
The duty to protect these rights falls first on the trial judge.
She has the duty to grant defense motions to suppress unconstitu-
tional confessions or illegally seized evidence, to change venue
when an impartial jury cannot be drawn from the community, and
to compel the prosecution to turn over exculpatory evidence. The
judge, however, has some discretion in determining whether a vio-
lation of these rights has occurred. When a defendant has been
found guilty, the judge imposes the sentence in most cases.
Aside from protecting the rights enumerated in the Bill of
Rights, the judge must conduct the trial so as not to infringe on
the defendant's right to "fundamental fairness" under the due pro-
cess clause of the fourteenth amendment.14 Due process does not
require a perfect trial, only a fair one.15 There is a range in which
a judge can conduct the trial in an unfair manner, so long as the
unfairness does not rise to a substantial level which an appellate
court cannot ignore. Examples of judicial conduct held not to be a
violation of federal due process include a judge's comment about
his belief of the defendant's guilt and about the defendant's prior
9. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
10. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
11. See Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
12. See, e.g., Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965).
13. See, e.g., Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349 (1910) (overly severe
sentence).
14. See generally 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(7) (1982). See, e.g., California v. Trom-
betta, 467 U.S. 479, 485 (1984).
15. 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 1068 (1985).
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conviction of the same crime,16 and a judge telling the defendant
in the presence of the jury that he should consider himself to be in
police custody.17
On appeal in state court, the trial judge's rulings on constitu-
tional, as well as other issues, are accorded a presumption of cor-
rectness.' 8 Even if a ruling is held to be incorrect, it could
nevertheless be considered harmless error.1 9 Under the harmless
error doctrine, a right could be violated without allowing the vic-
tim a remedy. This doctrine has been criticized for lessening the
protection of constitutional rights.20
In the area of sentencing, a convicted defendant cannot chal-
lenge a sentence on appeal which is within the statutory limits, un-
less she can show its severity was based on a constitutionally
improper basis.21 As a result, a sentencing judge can impose a har-
sher than necessary sentence to impress the public. That sentence
will stand on appeal unless an improper factor such as race or sex
is involved. The defendant has the burden of establishing that
factor.
Federal court review of these constitutional issues is ex-
tremely limited. All issues may be heard on certiorari to the
Supreme Court. Review is rare, however, and the Court does not
grant certiorari merely to correct errors in the state courts. The
Supreme Court, by necessity, must only grant certiorari to decide
compelling and important questions of law.22
On habeas corpus, review is still limited. The Supreme Court
in Stone v. Powell 23 held that fourth amendment issues cannot be
heard by a federal court as long as the defendant has had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in state court. A full and
fair opportunity does not mean that the state trial court's decision
is correct, only that the defendant had the issue heard.24 Whether
Stone will extend to other rights that do not answer the question
16. Walker v. Bishop, 295 F.Supp. 767 (E.D. Ark. 1967), aff'd, 408 F.2d 1378 (8th
Cir. 1969).
17. Payne v. Smith, 667 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 932
(1982).
18. 24A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1849 (1962 & Supp. 1988).
19. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967).
20. Steven H. Goldberg, Harmless Error: Constitutional Sneak Thief, 71 J.
Crim. L. & Criminology 421 (1980).
21. "[lIt is not the role of an appellate court to substitute its judgment for that
of the sentencing court as to the appropriateness of a particular sentence ...... So-
lem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 290 n.16. (1983). See, e.g., United States v. McCord, 466
F.2d 17 (2d Cir. 1972) (preferential sentencing on ground of religion).
22. Sup. Ct. R. 17.1.
23. 428 S.Ct. 465 (1976).
24. LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 27.3(d).
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of guilt or innocence has not been determined.
25
As for other constitutional issues, the federal courts will only
consider them if the defense raised the issue at trial. If the issue
was not raised at trial, the defendant must show cause and preju-
dice to excuse the default.26 Cause means there must be a good
excuse for not raising the issue. Prejudice means that had the is-
sue been raised, the result of the trial would have been different.
27
This is a very difficult standard to meet. Even a failure to antici-
pate a subsequent change in the law will not excuse a default.28
There is little or no federal appellate review of sentences.
29
A federal court will inquire if a sentence is imposed on an imper-
missible basis such as race, sex or political belief. It will also de-
termine if the sentence is disproportionate by using a three-prong
test measuring "(i) the gravity of the offense and the harshness of
the penalty; (ii) the sentences imposed on other criminals in the
same jurisdiction; and (iii) the sentences imposed for commission
of the same crime in other jurisdictions."30 These are very high
standards to meet and leave the trial judge with wide discretion.
Pressure from the electorate could make a trial judge, in ex-
ercising discretion, push the trial to the limits of the harmless er-
ror doctrine in order to obtain convictions. Then the trial judge
could sentence more harshly than necessary in order to impress
the public. Electoral pressure could then make an appellate judge
hide behind the harmless error doctrine, when she should vacate a
conviction.
B. Public Reaction to Defendant's Rights
The enforcement of defendants' constitutional rights has not
been well accepted by the public. One example is the Miranda v.
Arizona 3 1 decision to provide notice upon arrest that the suspect
has the right to remain silent, that statements can be used against
her at trial, and that she has the right to the assistance of an attor-
ney. Public reaction, as reflected by their elected representatives,
was hostile. Senator Sam Ervin said, "Enough has been done for
those who murder and rape and rob! It is time to do something for
those who do not wish to be murdered or raped or robbed."3 2 Sen-
25. LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 27.3(c).
26. LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 27.4(d) & (e).
27. Id.
28. See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527 (1986).
29. LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 25.2(f).
30. Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983).
31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. See generally Liva Baker, Miranda: Crime, Law, and Politics 201 (1983).
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ator John McClellan said, "The Supreme Court has set a low tone
in law enforcement, and we are reaping the whirlwind today! Look
at that chart [indicating the rising crime rate]! Look at it and weep
for your country. . . ."33 Reactions to such rulings as Mapp v.
Ohio,34 allowing illegally seized evidence to be excluded at trial,
and Escobedo v. Ilhinois,35 allowing the defendant to have an attor-
ney present during questioning, were also publicly decried.36
These and decisions made by the Supreme Court under Chief
Justice Earl Warren were seen as favorable to defendants. Presi-
dential candidates tried to exploit the public perception that guilty
people were being set free. Richard Nixon said,
From the point of view of the criminal forces, the cumu-
lative impact of these decisions has been to set free patently
guilty individuals on the basis of legal technicalities.
The tragic lesson of guilty men walking free from hun-
dreds of courtrooms across the country has not been lost on
the criminal community.37
Though the Warren Era ended in 1969, the rhetoric against
the Supreme Court and defendants' rights has not. President Ron-
ald Reagan and Attorney General Edwin Meese sought to narrow
those rights.38 They have also been outspoken on the need to be
tough on criminals. For instance, in response to a question
whether suspects should be given Miranda warnings, Meese said,
"Suspects who are innocent of a crime should. But the thing is,
you don't have many suspects who are innocent of a crime. That's
contradictory. If a person is innocent of a crime, then he is not a
suspect." 3 9
Whatever a legislator or executive may say or do, she cannot
33. George Cole, Politics and the Administration of Justice 21 (1973).
34. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
35. 378 U.S. 478 (1964).
36. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 32, at 33-35.
37. Id. at 211. For the speeches and public reaction of losing candidate George
Wallace, see id. at 243-44.
In a campaign speech in Deshler, Ohio, Richard Nixon said: "I was in Philadel-
phia the other day. I found that a cab driver who had been cruelly murdered and
robbed, and the man who murdered and robbed him had confessed the crime, was
set free because of a Supreme Court decision. An old woman, who had been bru-
tally robbed and then murdered - the man who confessed the crime was set free
because of a Supreme Court decision.... And an old man who had been robbed and
clubbed to death - and the man who confessed the crime was set free in Las Vegas
because of a Supreme Court decision. My friends, when that's happening in
thousands of cases all over America, I say this. Some of our courts have gone too
far in their decisions weakening the peace forces as against the criminal forces in
the United States of America. . ." Id. at 248.
38. Justice Under Reagan, U.S. News & World Rep., Oct. 14, 1985, at 58.
39. Reagan Seeks Judges With "Traditional Approach", U.S. News & World
Rep., Oct. 14, 1985, at 67.
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directly affect whether an individual defendant has a fair trial,
where all of her rights are protected. A trial judge can directly af-
fect it by presiding over the trial and making rulings that directly
affect what happens to the individual defendant. That is why the
trial judge must be insulated from public pressure.
III. Public Pressure on Judges
A. Examples
Public pressure on judges may not always be overt. An ex-
ample is the case of the Alday defendants. On May 14, 1973,
Wayne Coleman, George Dungee, and Carl Isaacs, escaped convicts
from a Maryland prison, and Isaacs' brother Billy, travelled down
the east coast to the small town of Donalsonville, Georgia. There,
they stopped to rob the mobile home of Jerry Alday and his fam-
ily. No one was home at the time the four broke in, but soon
thereafter the family members began to arrive. As they arrived,
each was callously shot to death, with Mary Alday also being
raped.40 Six members of the family were brutally murdered.
The murder of the popular family outraged the town.4 ' The
sheriff publicly said, "If I had my way about it, I'd have me a large
oven and I'd precook them for several days, just keep them alive
and let them punish .... And I don't think that would satisfy
me."42 This sentiment increased when Billy Isaccs testified about
Carl's mood after committing one of the murders. Billy said, "He
came out laughing .... Carl told us 'that bastard begged me for
mercy.' 43 At each of the defendant's trials, their attorneys
moved for a change of venue to protect their client's sixth amend-
ment right to a trial by an impartial jury. The judge ruled against
the defendants in all three cases. At Coleman's trial, seven of the
jurors were at least acquainted with one of the victims, and all
twelve were aware of the convictions of Carl Isaacs and George
Dungee, who were tried before Coleman.
Each of the defendants was convicted of first degree murder
and sentenced to death. On automatic appeal to the Georgia
Supreme Court (as required by the law in capital cases), the jus-
tices held that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in refus-
ing to grant a change of venue.44 When the defendants brought an
40. See Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487, 1488 (llth Cir. 1985).
41. Id. at 1488-1537.
42. Id. at 1501.
43. Id. at 1498.
44. Coleman v. State, 237 Ga. 84, 226 S.E.2d 911 (1976), cert denied sub nom.
Coleman v. Georgia, 431 U.S. 909 (1977); Isaacs v. State, 237 Ga. 105, 226 S.E.2d 922,
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action on state habeas corpus, the judge held that the change of
venue issue had already been dealt with adequately on appeal.45
On federal habeas corpus, the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals
held that the trial judge did abuse his discretion. The court va-
cated the convictions and ordered new trials for each of the three
defendants.46
A firestorm of protest ensued. Over 100,000 people signed a
petition to impeach the federal judges.47 The Governor of Georgia,
Joe Frank Harris, reacted to the decision with "shock and
disappointment."4
8
The state judges, who presided over the cases, had to have
been aware of the public's desire for conviction regardless of
whether the defendant's rights were violated. The sensational na-
ture of the case and the publicity it generated made a hostile pub-
lic attitude toward the defendants foreseeable. Yet the judges'
responsibility to protect the defendant's rights was equal to that of
the federal judges.
A more clear case for a change of venue is difficult to imag-
ine.49 The trial judge nevertheless knew that if he moved the case
away from the vengeful community, or if the state appeals judges
had granted a new trial, they would have lost their offices in the
next election. As a former Georgia Superior Court Judge stated:
[The] cases were tried in a Georgia court and reviewed
by the Supreme Court of Georgia. Why would these judges
rule one way on the change of venue issue and the federal
court another?
Politics. The trial judge and the Supreme Court justices
all are part of an electoral system that holds them directly ac-
countable to the voters. In the tense situation that existed fol-
cerL denied sub nom. Isaacs v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 986 (1976); Dungee v. State, 237 Ga.
218, 227 S.E.2d 746, cert denied sub noma Isaacs v. Georgia, 429 U.S. 986 (1976).
45. Dungee v. Hopper, 241 Ga. 236, 244 S.E.2d 849, cert. denied sub nom. Peek v.
Georgia, 439 U.S. 882 (1978).
46. Isaacs v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1482 (11th Cir. 1985), cert denied sub nom Kemp
v. Coleman, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986); Coleman v. Kemp, 778 F.2d 1487 (11th Cir. 1985),
cert denied, 476 U.S. 1164 (1986).
47. Atlanta Constitution, Dec. 12, 1985, at A38, col. 2. The impeachment drive
failed. After reviewing the petitions, the House Subcommittee on Courts, Civil Lib-
erties, and Administration of Justice stated, "[Flederal judges should not and can-
not be impeached for judicial decision making - even if the decision is an
erroneous one." Id. Oct. 17, 1986, at A26, col. 1.
48. Id. Dec. 12, 1985, at A38, col. 2. Commenting on the twelve years that the
appeals process took, Governor Harris said, "That's too long, regardless of whose
rights have been violated." Id. at col. 4.
49. The purpose of a change of venue is to not try a defendant in a community
where he or she would be prejudiced or seriously inconvenienced. See generally
LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 16.1(d). The constitution can require a change of
venue when pretrial publicity is too great. Groppi v. Wisconsin, 400 U.S. 505 (1971).
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lowing the Alday murders, it is not surprising that the trial
judge decided not to move the trial.
It is less understandable but certainly plausible that the
Supreme Court did not want to risk the political fallout from a
ruling reversing the convictions. These judges are for the most
part decent and learned, but they might have endangered their
careers by making such a controversial ruling.50
A state judge must be able to make difficult, controversial rulings
if he is to perform his function. The ability to make these rulings
should apply to all cases a judge hears. A few instances have been
gathered of judges who were voted out of office, not because of any
particular cases, but for being perceived as pro-defendant gener-
ally. This has occurred at both trial and appellate levels.
Trial level elections, because they are local, do not generate
widespread publicity. This has not immunized some judges from
electoral defeat, however. For example, one study gathered a few
instances of judges and magistrates who were defeated.5 ' In 1974,
Idaho magistrate Glenn Anderson was voted out of office after a
local newspaper implied that the voters should elect a magistrate
who would "back our police force and make it mean something to
juveniles to be caught breaking the law besides having a finger
wagged at them[.]"5 2 Illinois Circuit Judge Charles Then lost an
election after being criticized in the local newspaper as "being soft
on criminals."5 3 Indiana County Judge Andrew Giorgi lost be-
cause his handling of trials amounted to "fast crime and slow jus-
tice."54 Three Iowa judges were also not retained: David Halbach
for being "too lenient with juveniles"; Roger Halleck for failing "to
live up to his original promises to get tough with lawbreakers";
and Anthony Scolaro for giving "more deferred sentences for
drunk driving convictions than any other judge. ... 55s Penn-
sylvania Judge Thomas Wood, who believed in alternatives to
prison sentences, was voted off of the bench for being too lenient
with criminals.5 6
At the appellate level, particularly during elections for a
state's highest court, the publicity is potentially more widespread.
The most noteworthy example of an appellate election, where a
judge's criminal case rulings were a major issue, was the 1986 Cali-
50. Alex Crumbley, Alday Outrage Should Prompt Changes, Atlanta Constitu-
tion, Dec. 22, 1985, at D1, col. 2; D6, col. 2.
51. Susan Carbon & Larry Berkson, Judicial Retention Elections in the United
States 28-29 (1980).
52. Id. at 28.
53. Id. at 29.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 29-30.
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fornia Supreme Court election. Chief Justice Rose Bird and Jus-
tices Joseph Grodin and Cruz Reynoso of the California Supreme
Court were ousted. Though they did not face as emotional a case
as the Alday murders, they were perceived and attacked as being
"soft on crime," mainly because of their death penalty reversals.57
Bird, in particular, was the focus of a right wing campaign in
which an estimated $10,000,000 was spent to defeat her.58 Cam-
paign materials erroneously suggested that defendants, whose
death sentences she helped to reverse, were now on the streets.59
One television commercial showed a mother by a portrait of her
twelve-year-old daughter, who had been kidnapped, murdered, and
mutilated. The mother complained that because of Bird, her
daughter's killer was still alive.60 Bird lost by a margin of sixty-six
percent to thirty-four percent as a result of this negative public-
ity.6l Grodin and Reynoso, also accused of being soft on crime,
6 2
lost by margins of fifty-seven percent to forty-three percent and
sixty percent to forty percent, respectively.6 3 This was the first
time in California history that a supreme court justice had been
defeated.64
Before 1986, appellate judges had generally not been chal-
lenged and had enjoyed job security because of public indifference
to judicial elections.65 The disinterest of voters could be traced to
the boring campaigns that have typically been waged. Since judi-
cial ethics prevent a candidate from commenting on how he will
decide cases or to even take public stands on political issues, there
is little left to excite the public.66 Few voters cast votes in judicial
elections, and of those that do vote, most do not know the names
of the candidates.67 While California voters rejected the three jus-
tices, none of the eighty-eight Los Angeles County Superior Court
Judges were defeated. 68 So long as a judge does not attract atten-
57. See generally, Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1,
1987, at 52.
58. Id. at 54.
59. Id. at 52.
60. Id.
61. L. A. Times, Nov. 5, 1986, at 1, col. 2.
62. See Reidinger, supra note 57.
63. Supra note 61.
64. Bird was also the target of conservatives in her 1980 retention election.
There, the opposition was disorganized and started its campaign late. Bird retained
her position on the bench with 51.7% of the vote. See Preble Stoltz, Judging Judges
(1981).
65. Philip DuBois, From Ballot to Bench 33 (1980).
66. Id. at 32. See also id. at 64-66.
67. Id. at 33.
68. Rebecca Kuzins, Looking Beyond the Retention Elections, California Law-
yer, Oct. 1986, at 31, 50.
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tion, he will likely be retained.
Public indifference may be waning.69 In the 1986 elections,
judicial candidates were challenged at least in part because of
crime issues. North Carolina Supreme Court candidate James T.
Exum Jr. was attacked for being "soft on capital punishment."
70
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals Judge Edgar Parks faced the
same situation.71 A Republican group in California, perhaps be-
cause of the momentum they gained in the Bird campaign, began
to raise funds to target appeals court justices.
72
State court decisions have not generated as much publicity as
those of the United States Supreme Court. But the publicity in
California's supreme court election may begin a hazardous trend.
The public has seen how it can exert influence over the selection
of judges, and consequently the trend of judicial decision-making.
Therefore, state court elections may never again be characterized
by indifference and lack of knowledge about the candidates.
Some commentators feel the California election was an ex-
traordinary event that will not be repeated often. Bill Roberts, a
political consultant who ran the gubernatorial campaigns of Ron-
ald Reagan and George Deukmejian, said, "It's not likely to hap-
pen again[.] It's a one-time thing. Rose Bird was arrogant, and
there was a strong feeling that criminals were getting off too eas-
ily."73 Stanford law professor Barbara Babcock agreed. She said,
"[Bird] was hated from the time of her appointment because she
was appointed to revolutionize things. And she was a woman. The
situation that led to her defeat won't easily be replicated."
74
Neither of those comments account for the defeat of Justices
Grodin and Reynoso, however.
Others feel that the ousting of the three will influence judi-
cial decision-making. A Los Angeles Times poll showed that,
although only thiry-four percent of state judges favored retaining
Bird, fifty-three percent felt that judges would now have to worry
about the political consequences of their decisions. Only forty-one
percent admitted that they themselves would not be influenced.
75
Attorney and political science professor Robert Gerstein observed,
"Since the 1920s and 1930s there's been a realist school that says
69. For other judicial elections that year, some where crime was a major issue
and some where it was not, see generally id. and Reidinger, supra note 57.
70. See Reidinger, supra note 57, at 58.
71. Kuzins, supra note 68, at 31.
72. Id.
73. Reidixiger, supra note 57, at 54.
74. Id.
75. Recent Development, 9 Harv. J. L. & Pub. Pol'y 751, 754 (1986).
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there's no magic in judging.... You look at judges as political ac-
tors. There's less awe of judges now. There's less of a sense that
they are separate from the political system."76 Former California
Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus said, "[the election] has to give
special interest groups a new feeling of power." He further stated,
"I'm afraid the era of retaining judges on the basis of their charac-
ter, without tallying up their votes, is a thing of the past. There's
no way a judge is going to be able to ignore the political conse-
quences of certain decisions, especially if he or she has to make
them near election time. That would be like ignoring a crocodile
in your bathtub."
77
The implications for criminal defendants are beginning to
manifest themselves. The California Attorney General, perhaps
hoping to take full advantage of the new political makeup of the
court, asked the California Supreme Court in People v. Anderson 78
to overturn all of the Bird Court's precedents on the death pen-
alty.79 The court refused to overturn every ruling, but did over-
rule the two California Supreme Court precedents on intent.8 0
Those cases held that a person must have formed the intent to
murder before that person can be given the death penalty. In dis-
sent, Justice Broussard chastised the court for addressing the issue
of intent, when the case was decided on other grounds, and for the
tenuousness of the court's reasoning for overruling. Despite the
court's reversal of Anderson's conviction and grant of a new
trial,81 the issues raised in Justice Broussard's opinion, and the fact
that it now will be easier to execute criminals, make it clear that
the court was swayed by political considerations.
8 2
76. Kuzins, supra note 68, at 31.
77. Reidinger, supra note 57, at 58.
78. 43 Cal.3d 1104, 742 P.2d 1306, 240 Cal. Rptr. 585 (1987).
79. Id. at 1153, 742 P.2d at 1335, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 614.
80. Carlos v. Superior Court, 35 Cal.3d 131, 672 P.2d 862, 197 Cal. Rptr. 79
(1983); People v. Turner, 37 Cal.3d 302, 690 P.2d 669, 208 Cal. Rptr. 196 (1984).
81. Although the defendant won this particular appeal, the overall effect on
criminal defendants is worse than if the defendant had lost. As Justice Broussard
noted, because the defendant was granted a new trial, the defendant "will have lit-
tle incentive to seek review of this decision in the United States Supreme Court.
But having overruled Carlos in a case where it did not matter, the majority will be
able to cite this case to affirm a death penalty upon a defendant who did not intend
to kill." 43 Cal.3d at 1165 n.21, 742 P.2d at 1344 n. 21, 240 Cal.Rptr. at 623 n. 21
(Broussard, J., dissenting).
82. Without specifying what the phrase "political winds" referred to, Justice
Broussard wrote, "Periodically, when the political winds gust in a new direction, it
becomes necessary to remind all concerned of the virtues of a steady course. As
lawyers and judges, we sometimes deliver our reminder in Latin: stare decisis." 43
Cal.3d 1152, 742 P.2d at 1335, 240 Cal. Rptr. at 614 (Broussard, J., dissenting).
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IV. Judicial Selection and Federal Court Involvement
A. Methods of selection by state
States establish their court systems and judicial selection and
retention processes according to state constitutional law. Few
states follow the federal example granting judges Article III guar-
antees of tenure and salary level protection. Only Massachussets,8
3
New Hampshire,8 4 and Rhode Island8 5 offer judges, from courts of
general jurisdiction to the highest appellate court, life tenure after
initial appointment.
Appellate court judges from eight states - Connecticut,86
Delaware,8 7 Hawaii,88 Maine,8 9 New Jersey,9 0 New York,91 South
Carolina,92 Vermont,93 and Virginia94 - never face an election.
They initially are selected by appointment or nomination and are
retained by an executive or legislative body after a certain period
of time. The same is true for judges in courts of general jurisdic-
tion in those states, except in New York, where they must run for
election and reelection.
Two basic methods are used to select judges: (1) nomination
or appointment by the legislature or the executive and (2) partisan
election. The same methods are used for reappointment after a
certain number of years, except for the many states that use non-
partisan elections called retention elections. In a retention elec-
tion, the judge runs without opposition. Voters either choose to re-
tain or to remove the judge. If a judge is voted out of office, a new
judge fills the vacancy according to the state's method of selecting
judges. The newly appointed judge then faces a retention election
at a prescribed time. The number of states employing each type of
method are listed as follows:
83. Mass. Const. pt. 2, cl. 2, § 1, art.IX.; pt. 2, cl. 3, art I.
84. N.H. Const. pt. 2, art. 73.
85. R.I. Const. art. 10, § 4.
86. Conn. Const. art. 5, § 2; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 2-40 (1969).
87. Del. Const. art. IV, § 3, § 30; Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 906, 1303, 1702 (1974).
88. Haw. Const. art. VI, § 3.
89. Me. Const. art. 5, pt.1, § 8.
90. N.J. Const. art. 6, § 6, para. 3.
91. N.Y. Const. art. 6, § 2; N.Y. Jud. §§ 71, 68 (McKinney 1983).
92. S.C. Const. art. V, § 14; S.C. Code Ann. &§ 14-8-60, 14-3-40 (Law. Co-op. 1977
& Supp. 1987).
93. Vt. Const. ch. II, § 34; Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 4, §§ 71, 604, 4 (1981).







For Retention in Office
appointment 9 states
partisan election 9 states
retention election 29 states




For Retention in Office
appointment 3 states
partisan election 6 states
retention election 22 states95
B. History
Judicial elections began as an outgrowth of Jacksonian de-
mocracy. 96 Until that time, judges usually were appointed by the
governor subject to approval by the legislature, or they were
elected by the legislature. 97 Many became dissatisfied with those
methods because they saw judgeships as political spoils,98 and be-
cause they believed the elite judiciary was primarily concerned
with protecting the property interests of the wealthy.99
Most states adopted systems where judges were selected in
contested partisan elections.100 Judicial candidates were nomi-
nated by political parties in races resembling elections for legisla-
tive seats and governorships. Under this system, many of the best
persons were unwilling to run for judicial office because they did
not want to undergo the ordeal of campaigning.101 A Justice of the
Texas Supreme Court said:
mhe abler lawyers still will not exchange a sure or
promising career in private fields, with its greater financial re-
wards, for an appointment which is merely a head start for the
next election and thus entails all the political preoccupations
and risks of elective office, including risk of defeat and having
95. See Larry Berkson, Scott Belier & Michelle Grimaldi, Judicial Selection in
the United States (1980).
96. Id. at 3.
97. Id.
98. DuBois, supra note 65, at 3-4.
99. See supra note 51, at 3.
100. Supra note 51, at 1.
101. See DuBois, supra note 65, at 4. See also Report on Commission on Profes-
sionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986).
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to start life all over again when some opponent with a catchier
name or baby-kissing technique happens to want the office or
is financed to run for it by some disgruntled lawyer or
litigant.
102
A disgruntled anti-crime group could be added to that list today.
In 1937, the American Bar Association proposed the Merit Se-
lection Plan for selecting judges.103 The plan called for the gover-
nor or another senior elected official to appoint judges when
vacancies arose. The nominee would come from a list of candi-
dates nominated by a commission, composed of high judicial of-
ficers and members of the general public. The appointment would
be confirmed by a state senate or other legislative body, if the state
desired. After a specified number of years, the judge would un-
dergo reappointment or a retention election. The purpose of a re-
tention election is to make judicial elections non-political by
removing opposition candidates. Yet this was the kind of election
the California justices had to undergo.
C. Federal Oversight
Because state court systems are determined by state constitu-
tional and statutory law, neither the president nor congress has
any power to oversee state court systems. Neither do the federal
courts. The United States Supreme Court said, "It is the right of
every State to establish such courts as it sees fit, and to prescribe
their several jurisdictions as to territorial extent, subject-matter,
and amount, and the finality and effect of their decisions .... ,,104
As for the manner in which judges are selected, the Court said,
"Each State has the power to prescribe the qualifications of its of-
ficers and the manner in which they shall be chosen, ...whether
in the judicial courts or otherwise."105 The responsibility rests en-
tirely with the states.
State courts are forums for vindicating federal constitutional
rights. To the extent that those systems or methods of judicial se-
lection affect those rights, particularly due process rights, the fed-
eral courts can interfere with state systems. 0 6 In Tumey v.
102. W. St. John Garwood, Judicial Selection and Tenure - the Model Article
Provisions, 47 J. of the Am. Judicature Soc'y 21, 24 (1963).
103. Supra note 95, at 6.
104. Missouri v. Lewis, 101 U.S. 22, 30 (1879).
105. Boyd v. Nebraska ex rel. Thayer, 143 U.S. 135, 161 (1892).
106. "[Federal-state comity] principles simply are not.., a broad, discretionary de-
vice for the evasion of the responsibility of federal courts to protect federal rights
from invasion by state officials." Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of Louisiana, 565 F.2d
295, 299 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
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Ohio 107 the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance allowing
the mayor to sit as a judge in cases where the defendant could not
be imprisoned. Under the ordinance, the mayor, as judge, con-
victed and fined a defendant charged with unlawful possession of
an intoxicating beverage.' 0 8 Because the mayor was paid a per-
centage of the fines he levied, he could not be an impartial adjudi-
cator. The Court held that, while states may create their own
judicial systems, such systems must meet the requirements of due
process.' 09 It established a test in which "[e]very procedure which
would offer a possible temptation to the average man as a judge to
forget the burden of proof required to convict the defendant, or
which might lead him not to hold the balance nice, clear and true
between the State and the accused denies the latter due process of
law.""l 0 Not even legitimate state interests will overcome that
requirement."'
The Court went further in In re Murchison.112 It held that
even where a judge is in fact impartial, that judge must still sat-
isfy the appearance of impartiality. In Murchison, the Court in-
validated a Michigan procedure that let judges sit as one-person
grand juries in questioning witnesses suspected of perjury. The
judge suspected the witness of perjury. In chambers, he ques-
tioned the witness and convicted him on the spot. The Supreme
Court said, "[O]ur system of law has always endeavored to prevent
even the probability of unfairness. ' 113 This is to ensure that the
parties before the court respect the decisions of the judge and the
manner in which she conducts the trial.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals clarified the Tumey test
in Brown v. Vance."i4 There, the Mississippi system for compen-
sating justices of the peace by the number of cases the justice dis-
posed of was invalidated. The effect was that the police
deliberately wrote traffic tickets in districts where the defendant
would appear before a justice with a high conviction rate. Thus,
the justices with high conviction rates received most of the cases
and made the most money. Evidence indicated that several jus-
tices were impartial despite the incentive to convict. The court
107. 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
108. Id. at 515.
109. Id. at 523.
110. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510, 532 (1927).
111. Id. at 535 (discussing legislative interests of providing the system of courts,
determining the jurisdiction of its courts, the method of disposing fines, or stimulat-
ing prosecution of crime with rewards).
112. 349 U.S. 133 (1955).
113. Id. at 136.
114. 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1981).
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held that to be irrelevant. It stated that the Tumey test is used to
measure whether the system has the potential for partiality, not
whether the judge herself is impartial.
The Supreme Court mentioned judicial elections when it first
considered the use of television in a criminal trial. In Estes v.
Texas,115 the Court said:
Judges are human beings also and are subject to the
same psychological reactions as laymen. Telecasting is particu-
larly bad where the judge is elected ..... The telecasting of a
trial becomes a political weapon, which, along with other dis-
tractions inherent in broadcasting, diverts his attention from
the task at hand - the fair trial of the accused.116
Although the Court found no specific instances of prejudice to-
ward the defendant, it nevertheless invalidated the use of televi-
sion because, as the concurrence noted, "the prejudices of
television may be so subtle that it escapes the ordinary methods of
proof."ii 7 Estes was concerned more about the influence of televi-
sion on the witnesses and the jury than on the judge. The issue of
an election's effect on a judge was not adequately developed. Nev-
ertheless, the Court showed concern for "subtle pressures" that
could adversely affect a trial. An election's influence also would
be subtle.11
Though judicial elections were not a main issue, they became
a subissue in Stone v. Powell.119 The main concern of the opinion
was the state courts' capability for protecting defendants' fourth
115. 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965). The Court addressed the issue of non-tenured
judges in Palmore v. United States, 411 U.S. 389 (1973). The defendant claimed that
because he lived in the District of Columbia he was constitutionally entitled to an
Article III judge. He did not claim that the judge was biased and the issue of elec-
tions could not be reached because District of Columbia judges were appointed to
15 year terms. The Supreme Court held that The District of Columbia courts were
established pursuant to Congress' Article I power to govern the District, not Article
III. Therefore, Congress did not have to give those judges Article III protections.
116. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 548 (1965). Chief Justice Warren expressed
concern over a speech by the trial judge, which stated in part, "I took an oath to
uphold [the state] Constitution; not the Federal Constitution .. " The Chief Jus-
tice wrote:
One is entitled to wonder if such a statement would be made in a
court of justice by any state trial judge except as an appeal calculated
to gain the favor of his viewing audience. I find it difficult to believe
that this trial judge, with over 20 years' experience on the bench, was
unfamiliar with the fundamental duty imposed on him by Article VI
of the Constitution of the United States: [to hold the United States
Constitution supreme].
Id. at 566 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
117. Id. at 578 (Harlan, J., concurring).
118. When the Court later narrowed Estes in Chandler v. Florida, 449 U.S. 560
(1981), it did not address the issue of television's influence on the judge.
119. 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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amendment rights. The Court determined that state courts could
adequately vindicate a defendant's fourth amendment rights, so
that such claims would not be heard by federal courts on habeas
corpus.
The respondent claimed that state judges could not protect
fourth amendment rights as well as federal judges. The respon-
dent did not mention elections, but claimed that the proximity of
state judges to local law enforcement, such as the police and the
district attorney's office, caused state judges to be less sensitive to-
ward a defendant's constitutional rights.12o The amicus brief of
the American Civil Liberties Union (A.C.L.U.) agreed. It cited
seventeen recent cases where a defendant's Fourth Amendment
claims had to be vindicated in federal court after adverse rulings in
state courts.121 The proximity argument appears weak, particu-
larly when one considers that state judges are institutionally no
closer to local police or district attorneys than federal judges are to
the F.B.I. or the Justice Department. Nevertheless, a five to four
majority stated:
Despite differences in institutional environment and the un-
sympathetic attitude to federal constitutional claims of some
state judges in years past, we are unwilling to assume that
there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to
constitutional rights in the trial and appellate courts of the
several States.122
This passage does not address or offer an explanation for the cases
cited in the A.C.L.U. brief. The dissent noted that "[sItate judges
popularly elected may have difficulty resisting popular pressures
not experienced by federal judges given lifetime tenure designed
to immunize them from such influences... "123 Perhaps if the
question of judicial elections was directly put in front of the Court,
the Court would mandate change or at least expand the opportuni-
ties for state prisoners to bring their constitutional claims in fed-
eral court.
Due process means that a judge will fairly and impartially
consider any claims that a defendant makes under the federal Bill
of Rights. Any part of a state judicial system that infringes upon a
judge's ability to be impartial must be invalidated. As Justice
Brennan stated, "The mere invocation of the 'slogan state's rights'
does not authorize the judiciary to 'administer a watered-down,
120. Brief for Respondent at 87, Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (No. 74-
1055).
121. Brief of American Civil Liberties Union, Amicus Curiae at 18-27, Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976) (Nos. 74-1055 & 74-1222).
122. Stone, 428 U.S. at 494.
123. Id. at 524 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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subjective version of the individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights
when state cases come before [the Court].'"124 Since federal
courts protect the federal due process right, they would have to in-
validate judicial elections if shown that elections infringed on that
right.
V. The Suitability of Elections for Judicial Office
A. The arguments for and against judicial elections
Many reasons are advanced for electing judges. Three of the
most basic reasons are: (1) elections make judges accountable for
their actions; (2) since judges affect public policy, the public should
have a voice regarding who holds office; and (3) judges are inevita-
bly political, whether elected or not, so elections make a judge ac-
countable to the people, not to the official who appoints judges.
2 5
Under the accountability argument, an incompetent judge
could be removed from office, instead of serving for as long as he
pleases. Also, judges are immune from civil liability for their deci-
sions, so an election is the only way to check their power. This ar-
gument does not consider the need for a judge to be free to take
unpopular, but constitutionally mandated, action. A state's interest
in accountability cannot outweigh an individual's freedoms guaran-
teed by the Bill of Rights.126
Regardless of the necessity for protecting rights, elections do
not fulfill the goal of accountability. The A.B.A. Commission said,
"Interestingly, it has long been observed that popular elections of
judges rarely offer accountability to the public."1 2 7 The federal
system has never been shown to have more incompetent or irre-
sponsible judges than the state courts. The states can ensure they
have quality judges by having the governor, or whoever appoints
judges, take the responsibility seriously by making a thorough in-
vestigation into a nominee's qualifications and character. The
A.B.A. Commission stated that, even where judges are initially ap-
pointed, "more must be done to obtain the best qualified judges
and to depoliticize the entire process."'128 The report did not spec-
ify the steps to be taken, however.
Though judges' rulings do create policy, the public should not
124. Brennan, supra note 7, at 541 (brackets in original).
125. DuBois, supra note 65, at 6-28.
126. Cf. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927) (state interests insufficient to over-
come defendant's due process requirement of an impartial adjudicator).
127. Report of Commission on Professionalism, 112 F.R.D. 243, 293 (1986).
128. Id. at 294.
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be able to pressure a judge into ignoring the constitutional rights
of an individual. Judges' primary responsibility is to decide the
case before them. The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated:
[Tihe reality and the appearance of 'political justice' are in-
compatible with the assumptions of a system of government of
laws not men. Ours is an era in which members of the judici-
ary often are called upon to adjudicate cases squarely present-
ing hotly contested social or political issues. The state's
interest in ensuring that judges be and appear to be neither
antagonistic nor beholden to any interest party, or person is
entitled to the greatest respect.
129
Whatever policies result from a judge's decisions can be over-
turned or modified by the legislature.
Proponents of elections also claim that judges are political
whether they are elected or appointed. 3 0 Arguably, if elected,
they follow the will of the people and, if appointed, they follow the
will of whoever appoints them. Although judges can never be in-
sulated completely from the political process, they are less likely
to be political if they do not have to run for reelection. If a judge
is appointed to carry out his appointer's political agenda, or if a
judge is elected to carry out a political party's agenda, with tenure
protection, he may ignore those political expectations without fear
of electoral retribution.
There are many reasons for not holding elections. The pri-
mary reason is that judges need to be impartial and unbiased. If
they feel their job depends upon ruling one way or another, they
cannot perform their function and the defendants before them will
not respect their decisions. Another reason is the public apathy to-
ward judicial elections. The public knows little about the candi-
dates or the issues. Supporters of elections, on the issue of voter
apathy, point out that voters likewise know little or nothing about
their state legislative representatives.' 3 ' Ignorant voters are no
justification for having elections. Whenever voters are apathetic
about an election, the potential exists for a pressure group to tar-
129. Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of Louisiana, 565 F.2d 295, 302 (5th Cir. 1977),
cert denied 435 U.S. 1013 (1978). Louisiana Appeals Court Judge Morial challenged
Louisiana law requiring him to resign his judgeship in order to run for mayor of
New Orleans. Morial claimed the law violated his right to free speech under the
first amendment. When he claimed that the state interest in a non-political judici-
ary was disavowed by having judicial elections, the Court claimed under equal pro-
tection analysis that a state did not have to exercise "the full extent of its power to
prevent some evil." Id. at 302-03 n.6. Judge Fay, dissenting, felt that the law re-
vealed that the state was not sincere in its interest of having a non political judici-
ary because of the judicial elections. Id. at 308-10.
130. See DuBois, supra note 65, at 20-28.
131. Id. at 62-63.
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get someone and exert a disproportionate influence to defeat a
candidate.
Moreover, some feel that an election and its campaign de-
means a judge and causes loss of public respect. In response, those
who support elections point to the strict guidelines for judicial can-
didates and attorneys not to comment on political issues or issues
before the court and to confine their comments to the qualifica-
tions of the candidates.132 Nevertheless elections place attorneys
in a difficult position. They have a duty to speak out about the
judge's qualifications, or lack thereof, but must avoid any mislead-
ing statements which might lessen public confidence in the judici-
ary.'3 3 Though they have this duty to speak, attorneys face
sanctions for making false or misleading statements, even if made
in good faith.134 If the judge and attorney comply and do not
speak about issues, then the public has little basis on which to cast
a ballot.
Additional reasons for eliminating elections are evident from
the examples of elections in this article. Although the Alday de-
fendants were able to find justice in the federal courts, those
courts, with their crowded dockets, are unable and unwilling to re-
view every state criminal case.135 There must be some mechanism
for insulating judges from the public hysteria that a sensational
case can generate. Even if a judge never hears a particular case
that generates a huge public outcry, he would still have to worry
that some group, such as Rose Bird's opponents, was keeping score
on each ruling. A judge's rulings or imposition of a sentence in an
individual case can be very complex. Requiring a judge to explain
the results of many cases during an election campaign would be
impractical.136 Therefore, the inquiry would become superficial.
A judge could have a difficult time explaining legal reasoning
to the general public while the judge's opponents wage an emo-
tional campaign against him. When the mother of a young daugh-
ter, who was brutally murdered and mutilated, complains in a
television commercial about a judge vacating the killer's death sen-
tence, the judge has little recourse. 137 A judge can explain that a
defendant's right was violated, which warrants a new trial, but the
132. See generally Comment, First Amendment Rights of Attorneys and Judges
in Judicial Election Campaigns, 47 Ohio St. L. J. 201 (1986).
133. Id. at 203.
134. Id. at 209, 211.
135. Supra note 2. Though they eventually received justice, twelve years passed
from the time the three defendants were convicted and sentenced in January, 1974,
to the time their new trials were ordered in December, 1985.




public, unfamiliar with constitutional law, sees only the grieving
mother and a picture of the innocent victim. When many politi-
cians assert that rights given to defendants are rights taken away
from victims, the public naturally feels little sympathy for the de-
fendant. i38 Professor Shiffrin said, "Appellate judges are vulnera-
ble because the electorate is not reading their opinions. They are
sitting ducks. They cannot publicly discuss their opinions. If
someone makes an attack on them, they can't respond."
39
The main reason for eliminating elections remains the need
for judges to be openminded and to have the ability to take tough
action. As Professors Brest and Leff explained during the Califor-
nia campaign:
Citizens are free to vote for or against political candidates for
any reason. After all, we choose them to represent our views.
But justices are different from politicians on the ballot. They
are not our representatives. On the contrary, their duty is to
uphold the Constitution and laws even when that is politically
unpopular.140
The judicial office, whether trial or appellate, is not suited for
elections.
B. The Code of Judicial Conduct
The American Bar Association Code of Judicial Conduct,'
4 '
particularly Canon 7, illustrates the inappropriateness of elections.
Canon 7 circumscribes a judge's ability to participate in political
parties,142 to support candidates for other elective offices,' 43 and to
raise campaign funds.44 A judge simply cannot put together an
organization or solicit funds as candidates for other offices may.
He cannot seek endorsements or other support.' 45 Canon 5(G)
prohibits a judge from "accept[ing an] appointment to a govern-
mental committee, commission, or other position that is concerned
with issues of fact or policy on matters other than the improve-
ment of the law, the legal system, or the administration of jus-
tice." 46 Because a judge is limited to speaking only about
138. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
139. Kuzins, supra note 68, at 50.
140. Paul Brest & Elizabeth Leff, When Judging Justices: Arguments to the
Jury, L.A. Times, Nov. 2, 1986 at § V, at 3, col. 1.
141. Model Code of Judicial Conduct (1984).
142. Id. Canon 7(A)(1)(a).
143. Id. Canon 7(A)(1)(b).
144. Id. Canon 7(A)(2).
145. Id. Canon 7(B)(2).
146. Id. Canon 5(G).
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experience and qualifications, he cannot offer a policy on which
the electorate can vote.
Canon 7 restricts a judge's ability to address issues. It says a
judge "should not make pledges or promises of conduct in office
other than the faithful and impartial performance of the duties of
the office; announce his views on disputed legal or political issues;
or misrepresent his identity, qualifications, present position, or
other fact."147 In the context of defendants' rights, a judge will
not be able to state that he will be "tough on crime" or that he will
"put criminals behind bars" or make any other similar statements.
A judge who merely says that he will have a "strict sentencing phi-
losophy" violates the Canon.148 Some judges have found this Ca-
non hard to follow. When speaking about capital punishment, a
judicial candidate in Pennsylvania said, "I think I'd pull the switch
myself." Another said that he would bring to the bench the "per-
spective of law enforcement from... the prosecutorial side .... "1
49
If a justification for judicial elections is for the public to control ju-
dicial policy making, the public needs information which judges
cannot provide without violating Canon 7.
The Canon changes those requirements whenever a judge
draws active opposition. If opposed, he "may campaign in response
thereto and may obtain publicly stated support and campaign
funds in the manner provided in subsection B(2)."150 Implicit in
this assumption is that once a candidate is challenged by the oppo-
sition on his record, the candidate can then comment on his past
rulings or give clues as to how he will rule in the future. A judge
could not satisfy the appearance of impartiality if he makes state-
ments that imply a campaign promise, especially when the judge
will face another election sometime in the future where the public
may hold him to those statements.
Canon 7 foresees elections where judges run solely on their
qualifications and not on their politics.'51 To inject political issues
is to invite the appearance of partiality or a political agenda. The
Canon is powerless to stop this scenario once a pressure group at-
tacks a candidate's record. The only way to avoid this is to not
have judicial elections.
147. Id. Canon 7(B)(1)(c).
148. See A.B.A. Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op.
1444 (1980).
149. See Bruce Kauffman, Judicial Selection in Pennsylvania, 27 ViU. L. Rev.
1163, 1168-69 (1981-82). Contra Morial v. Judiciary Comm'n of Louisiana, 565 F.2d
295, 305, n. 11 (5th Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 1013 (1978).
150. Supra note 141, Canon 7(B)(3).




Although Canon 7 is the only Canon to speak directly to elec-
toral conduct, other Canons are also applicable. Canon 2 states
that a judge "should conduct himself at all times in a manner that
promotes public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the
judiciary."152 Emotional campaigns, where a candidate is forced to
take positions on legal and political issues, do not serve this goal.
The Canon also states that a judge should not "convey or permit
others to convey the impression that they are in a special position
to influence him."153 The Georgia judges, who presided over the
Alday trials and appeals, could hardly convey the impression that
the enraged community was not in "a special position to influ-
ence", knowing that the community would have its say at the next
election.
This issue is addressed more specifically in Canon 3, which
states that "[a judge] should be unswayed by partisan interests,
public clamor, or fear of criticism."'154 When judicial elections
drew little voter interest, it was easy for judges to comply with this
canon. Now that judicial elections draw more attention, 5
5 compli-
ance will be more difficult. The electoral pressure can be sublimi-
nal.156 As with television cameras in the courtroom, the influence
can be "so subtle that it escapes ordinary methods of proof."'
157
This influence does not further the goal of the Model Code, ex-
pressed in Canon 1, which states, "An independent and honorable
judiciary is indispensable to justice in our society."'
1 58
VI. The Elimination of State Judicial Elections
A. The parties to enact reform
The impetus for election reform should come from state leg-
islatures or state executives. Since no interest group advocates de-
fendants' rights, and since the public is generally hostile toward
them, 5 9 neither legislators nor executives will take any action the
public perceives as being favorable to defendants. If this reform
was part of a more general reform aimed at enhancing judicial im-
partiality for all matters, criminal and civil, it may have a chance
to be enacted.
The debate over methods of selecting judges has spanned the
152. Supra note 141, Canon 2(A).
153. Id. Canon 2(B).
154. Id. Canon 3(A)(1).
155. See Reidinger, supra note 57 and Kuzins, supra note 68.
156. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
157. Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 578 (1965) (Harlan, J., concurring).
158. Supra note 141, Canon 1.
159. See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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history of the country' 60 and continues to the present.16 ' Profes-
sor Allen finds that "the salient fact remains that in the United
States no persons or agencies possess political or administrative re-
sponsibility for the decency and efficiency of criminal justice as a
whole. We have not been ingenious in devising institutions that
subject criminal justice functions to scrutiny and test."' 62 Legisla-
tures and executives have shirked the responsibility to oversee
criminal procedure.
Because an impartial judge is a fundamental requirement of
federal due process, federal courts may have to take action. As
Professors LaFave and Israel state, "[Clommentators who favor
legislative solutions to many of the issues resolved by the Court ac-
knowledge that the Court has frequently been forced into action
by the persistent failure of the legislative branch to treat those is-
sues. The choice, it is argued, has been between the Court assum-
ing responsibility for the decency of the criminal justice process
and no one assuming that responsibility."'163
It would not be beyond a federal court's ability if that court
were forced to command changes in the way a state selects and re-
tains judges. Justice Jackson said that criminal procedure is a
"specialized responsibility within the competence of the judiciary
on which they do not bend before political branches of Govern-
ment, as they should on matters of policy which comprise substan-
tive law."164 Justice Harlan agreed when he said, "[procedural
guarantees] are questions which the Constitution has entrusted at
least in part to courts, and upon which courts have been under-
stood to possess particular competence."'165 This is because courts
deal with the procedures by which legislative policies and constitu-
tional rights are vindicated.
A defendant could raise the claim by moving at trial that the
judge recuse herself for bias. If a judge had made anti-defendant
statements during a campaign or if the judge has been targeted by
a pressure group, the defendant would have a good factual basis on
which to make her claim. Even if the judge were to recuse herself,
the replacement judge would also have been an elected judge, so
relief could not be granted by the state trial court. State appellate
160. See supra note 51, at 1-10.
161. See Kauffman, supra note 149.
162. Frances Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and
the Criminal Cases, 1975 U. Ill. L.F. 518, 524-25 (1975) (quoted in Lafave & Israel,
supra note 2, § 2.7(b), n. 18).
163. LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 2.7(b).
164. Shaughnessy v. United States ex rel. Mezei, 345 U.S. 206, 224 (1953) (Jack-
son, J., dissenting).
165. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 70 (1967) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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judges, who also face elections, would not be able to grant relief
either. Since selection of judges is a matter for state legislatures,
the judges would be powerless to grant relief.
The claim could be brought to the Supreme Court on direct
appeal or to the federal district court on habeas corpus. Similarly
situated prisoners could band together in a class action suit on
habeas corpus, because habeas corpus is a civil proceeding.166 On
habeas corpus, a prisoner can assert that she is illegally detained
because of violations of due process under the U.S. Constitution.
6 7
Though the right to an impartial judge is not enumerated in
the first eight amendments of the Bill of Rights, it is an element of
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment, which ap-
plies to the states.16 8 In due process analysis, the nature of the
deprivation determines the amount of process that is due. 6 9 If an
impartial adjudicator is needed when a defendant is subject to a
fine,170 then the need for judicial impartiality becomes more com-
pelling when a defendant is subject to a prison sentence or a death
sentence.
The federal court would still be reluctant, because of federal-
state comity, to tell the states how to run their court systems.171
Nevertheless, the federal courts have interfered in state and local
political and government affairs in a number of instances. These
include abolishing poll taxes,172 outlawing gerrymandering of
political districts,173 easing the malapportionment of state legisla-
tures according to the "one man-one vote" rule,174 drawing school
district boundaries requiring the busing of school children,175 and
ordering changes in state prison systems. 76
The federal courts have ordered changes in state court sys-
tems. A federal court ordered Ohio not to allow a mayor to sit as a
judge when a fine which is to be imposed is used to supplement his
salary, 77 or even if the fine is to be added to the city treasury.
7 8
A federal court ordered a state not to pay its justices of the peace
166. LaFave & Israel, supra note 2, § 27.1(a).
167. Id. § 27.3(b); 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1982).
168. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
169. See generally 16C C.J.S. Constitutional Law § 967 (1985).
170. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 510.
171. But see supra note 127 and accompanying text.
172. Harper v. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
173. Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960).
174. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
175. See, e.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971).
176. See, e.g., Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
177. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 (1927).
178. Ward v. City of Monroeville, 409 U.S. 57 (1972).
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according to how many convictions the justices secured.179 A fed-
eral court would not necessarily have to dictate a solution. It could
invalidate elections and leave it to the states to work out alterna-
tive solutions.
B. Solutions
Tenure protection may not necessarily have to be life tenure.
Tenure protection could mean reappointment by a legislative or
executive body. Legislators and executives deal with many other
issues that arouse public interest such as education, taxes, and the
environment. Of the issues that judges deal with, crime is the pre-
dominant one which arouses the public. Because of this, the public
is less likely to vote a legislator or executive out of office on the
single issue of judicial appointments. If the public disapproves of a
legislator's vote for reappointment of a particular judge, they may
approve of other reappointments. If the public disapproves of a
legislator's votes for reappointment overall, they still may approve
of his or her record on other issues and not vote the legislator out
of office.
A possible solution could be to require tenure protection for
the trial level judges only.i8 0 As an alternative, there might be a
provision to grant tenure protection for appellate judges only.
Trial level tenure would be preferable, if a choice is to be made,
because the harmless error doctrine would not be used to excuse
constitutional violations. Also, it would be preferable for judicial
economy since, when judges rule correctly, there is less need for
an appeal. So long as one layer has protection, then there will be
one point where tough decisions could be made.
Another solution could be to limit tenure protection to crimi-
nal courts because of the peculiar nature of criminal trials. Elec-
tions could be retained for a state's civil courts. This could be
justified on due process grounds because of the compelling interest
a defendant has in her freedom and even in her life itself. The is-
sues of imprisonment or death do not arise in civil trials. This so-
lution, however, may appear to give defendants a special favor.
Life tenure for all judges would be the best solution. It pro-
vides the most insulation for the judge because she would not be
influenced by any public body. It also eliminates the problems in-
herent in judicial campaigns and elections.
Whichever solution is chosen by the state or imposed by the
179. Brown v. Vance, 637 F.2d 272 (5th Cir. 1982).
180. See Ward, 409 U.S. at 61-62 ("[defendant] is entitled to a neutral and de-
tached judge in the first instance").
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federal court, it must insulate judges from public pressure. It will
only be adequate if state judges will not have any "temptation"
which will make them "forget the burden of proof required to con-
vict" or make them not "hold the balance nice, clear, and true be-
tween the State and the accused."isi
VII. Conclusion
Though judicial elections had been characterized by voter in-
difference and lack of issues, the potential remained for a trial or
appellate judge to be voted out of office, not because of the judge's
ability, but because the judge is seen by the public as being too
favorable to defendants. Despite the indifference, some judges
were voted out of office. A judge's standing with the public was
still a subtle influence in his performance, particularly in highly
publicized cases.
Judicial elections, particularly at the appellate level, are now
drawing much public attention. They are being decided on hotly
contested political issues and are drawing large sums in campaign
contributions. The defeat of the three California judges has shown
the nation's voters what they can do when they need an outlet for
their rage against crime.
That election may have been an aberration in the routine of
uncontested elections. Considering the amount of money spent for
that election, as well as other state elections that year, one must
expect that hotly contested elections, where crime is likely to be a
major issue, will be the trend in the future.
Regardless how elections will be in the future, the judicial of-
fice is not suited for public ballot. None of the reasons suggested
for having judges face election have been realized. Judges, more
than legislators or executives, have a duty to protect minority
rights. This duty is difficult to perform when a judge is subject to
majoritarian pressure.
Furthermore, a primary requirement of due process is that
the judge be unbiased and impartial. Judges cannot heed outside
pressure or carry out a political agenda and expect the parties
before them to respect their decisions and rulings. Since an impar-
tial adjudicator is a matter of federal due process, election reform
may have to be stimulated by federal court action. However re-
form is initiated and whatever reform is enacted, state judges
should have the necessary independence in order to fully protect
the rights of criminal defendants.
181. Tumey, 273 U.S. at 532.
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